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Introduction
On 17 April (2009), the second 
meeting of ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) and AAF 
(Asia Forum) meeting took place in 
Singapore. This one-day conference 
was organised by the Singapore 
Institute of International Affairs 
(SIIA) and was attended by some 
300 representatives of the region’s 
governments, private sector and 
think-tanks. Given the timing of 
this meeting it is not surprising that 
one of the key issues raised by the 
forum was what Asian governments, 
multinational corporations and 
institutions should do in response 
to the current global fi nancial crisis 
(GFC). This paper reviews the impact 
of the current crisis on the economies 
of ASEAN and East Asia, the policy 
responese, and their likely outcomes, 
in the context of the presentations 
made at the ASEAN-AAF meeting.
The impacts of the 
global fi nancial crisis 
First round: Asia spared
It was originally believed that the 
spillovers from the USA’s subprime 
mortgage crisis on Asian fi nancial 
and real economic activity would 
be relatively limited, and that the 
growth prospects of Asian econo-
mies would remain strong, with 
no signifi cant downturn (Brooks 
and Hua 2009: 103; Sachs 2009: 4). 
There were good reasons to expect 
Asia to be relatively shielded from 
the crisis because, unlike the major 
fi nancial institutions in the USA and 
in Europe, those in Asia had only 
limited exposure to subprime-related 
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products (IMF 2009a: 71; IMF 2009b: 
4). The fundamental factor explaining 
this limited exposure is that having 
experienced their own financial crisis 
10 years ago, many Asian banks were 
cautious over investing in high-risk 
and high-return assets (see also 
Dixon 2009). According to the Asian 
Development Bank (Asian Devel-
opment Bank), the region’s banks 
reported only 0.09% direct exposure 
of subprime assets (ADB 2009b: 2). 
This report, notes that according to 
Bloomberg, of the US$1292.6 billion 
written off by major banks since 1 
October 2007, Asian financial institu-
tions accounted only for US$35.8 
billion (see Table 1). In addition, the 
reforms implemented during and 
after the 1997 crisis had made Asian 
financial sectors relatively resilient 
to global shocks and well prepared 
for this crisis (ADB 2009b: 2). In 
short, Asian countries were relatively 
unscathed by subprime related-mort-
gage assets during the early stage of 
the crisis. Because of this, as the IMF 
Deputy Managing Director, Takatoshi 
Kato, remarked at the Harvard Asia 
Business Conference in February 
2009: ‘for a while, Asian economies 
took comfort from not being at the 
epicenter of the crisis, hoping that 
improved macroeconomic fundamen-
tals and relatively sound bank and 
corporate balance sheets would insu-
late them from the financial turmoil.’
Second round: hit by 
capital flight
Yet, even though Asian financial 
institutions entered the global finan-
cial crisis with limited exposure to 
subprime-related assets, and had 
relatively healthy financial posi-
tions, the crisis and slowdown in the 
USA and Europe have had effects 
on Asia’s financial markets through 
capital flow channels (IMF 2009b: 
4). Indeed, the IMF concluded that 
the impact of the GFC on domestic 
financial markets in Asia have been 
substantial (IMF 2009a: 71). In other 
words, while being spared in the first 
round of the crisis, Asian countries 
were hit by the second round, when 
foreign capital and investments fled 
the region, causing currency depreci-
ation and sharp falls in stock market 
prices. During 2008, stock markets 
tumbled by some 58% in Indonesia 
and India, 50% in Thailand and 
Singapore, and by over 65% in China. 
Overall, Southeast and East Asian 
stock markets fell more than the Dow 
Jones index, which fell by 31% during 
2008. Thus, according to Kato (2009), 
the current crisis dismantled the 
myth that the Asian economies were 
insulated from the global financial 
turmoil. He maintains that because 
they dramatically increased their par-
ticipation in international financial 
markets, this opened several channels 
of transmission of the global financial 
turmoil to the region (see also IMF 
2009b: 4). Firstly, because foreign 
Table 1: Capital write-downs and raised by major banks between  
1 October 2007 and 3 April 2009 (US$ billon) 
Write-downs Raised
World  1292.6  1109.4
America  869.6  646.0
Europe  387.2  393.6
Asia  35.8  69.7
Source: ADB 2009b
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investors increased their holdings 
of Asian assets during the boom, 
the outflows during the crisis have 
been quite substantial. According 
to Kato (2009) outflows from equity 
markets alone in emerging Asia, 
amounted to some US$70 billion in 
2008. Secondly, the increased depend-
ence of Asian banks on international 
wholesale funding made them 
particularly exposed to the proc-
ess of global deleveraging and the 
resulting shortage of dollar funding. 
Thirdly, since the region’s corpora-
tions increased their reliance during 
the boom period on foreign fund-
ing, such as bond, equity and loan 
issuance, they were more exposed 
to refinancing risks when access to 
foreign borrowing was curtailed.
Third round: hit hard 
by export decline
Nevertheless, what struck ASEAN 
members and other Asian countries 
the hardest, though in an indirect 
way, was the third and final round, 
during which the GFC and recession 
in the West began to have serious 
effects on Asia’s real economies 
through trade channels. As Dr. 
Noleen Heyzer, Under-Secretary-
General of the United Nations and 
Executive Secretary, Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific said in her opening speech 
at the ASEAN-AAF, ‘what started 
as a financial crisis in the West has 
become an economic crisis in the 
East’. Indeed, the impact of the global 
financial crisis on Asia’s economies 
has been surprisingly heavy and 
dramatically affected the region’s 
economies (IMF 2009a: 71). According 
to a study by the Asian Development 
Bank undertaken in April 2009, this 
crisis presents Asian countries ‘with 
its most difficult economic challenges 
in recent times’ being even broader, 
deeper and more complex than the 
one they experienced 10 years ago 
(Asian Development Bank 2009b: 2). 
This is because during the previous 
crisis, heathy growth and demand 
in the developed economies helped 
support Asia’s recovery. However, 
this time the USA and Europe are in 
recession and their consumption, on 
which the region had long depended, 
is in decline. In other words, the 
fundamental factor lying behind 
this downturn is that the growth of 
Asian economies depends heavily 
on exports to developed markets, 
which have fallen dramatically since 
the outbreak of the financial crisis.
Prior to the GFC, Asian economies 
enjoyed impressive growth. Indeed, 
as Kato (2009) points out, ‘it was 
only last summer that the region was 
enjoying double-digit expansion of 
its industrial production base’. How-
ever, it was the exports of the region 
to the outside world that played the 
‘As a result of the drastic fall 
of exports, Asian economic 
growth rates have fallen 
sharply and are projected  
to drop further’
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major part in this growth. Over the 
last three decades, the region had 
enjoyed a rapid growth of intra-
regional trade (Brooks and Hua 
2009: 125-6). Because of this, it was 
widely believed that Asia’s depend-
ence on external trading partners had 
decreased (IMF 2009b: 2). However, 
according to Kato (2009) this was 
a mistaken view, because in reality 
global demand still represented a 
major factor behind Asia’s export 
growth (see also Brooks and Hua 
2009: 125-6). Thus, the current crisis 
dismantled another widely held myth 
that ‘emerging economies in Asia are 
decoupled from the business cycle 
of advanced economies’ (Kato 2009). 
The growth of Asia’s intraregional 
trade was largely driven by trade 
in parts and components within 
regional production networks, whose 
finished products were eventually 
exported to extra-regional markets. 
In other words, trade within Asia is 
part of a globalised supply chain, 
which is ultimately linked to demand 
in the external world. It is estimated 
that about half of the intra-regional 
exports, including both direct exports 
and indirect exports through a grow-
ing intra-Asian re-export trade, were 
destined for Westen markets. Thus, 
the crisis and the slowdown of the 
advanced countries cut a vital source 
of the Asia’s economic growth (ADB 
2009b: 3; IMF 2009: 2-4). During the 
final quarter of 2008 exports from 
East and Southeast Asia contracted 
by some 30% and significant overall 
declines were projected for 2009 (ADB 
2008b: 39; Table 2). Electronics exports 
have been particularly hit, and badly 
weakening export performance in 
South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Singapore. Other Asian countries, 
such as Cambodia and Indonesia 
have also suffered as the consumption 
in advanced markets of their major, 
labor-intensive export goods, such 
as textiles, toys, and footwear has 
sharply contracted. In addition, fall-
ing commondity prices have badley 
affected Vietnam, Indonesia, Thai-
land, and Malaysia (ADB 2009b: 3).
As a result of the drastic fall of 
exports, Asian economic growth 
rates have fallen sharply and are 
projected to drop further. Growth 
in East Asia declined from 10.4% in 
2007 to 6.6% in 2008, and is forecast 
to shrink to 3.6% in 2009, despite 
the relatively strong performance 
of China. Growth in Southeast Asia 
was only 4.3% in 2008, compared 
with 6.4% in 2007, and may fall 
to below 1% in 2009 (Table 3).
Table 2: Annual percentage growth rates of merchandise exports in
Southeast and East Asian countries
2007 2008 2009*
ASEAN** 12.2 14.5 -17.7
Indonesia 14.0 18.0 -25.0
Malaysia 9.6 12.8 -13.3
Singapore 10.5 13.1 -16.1
Thailand 17.3 16.8 -18.0
Vietnam 21.9 29.1 -31.8
East Asia*** 18.9 13.4 -6.2
China 25.8 17.3 -4.3
South Korea 14.2 14.3 -15.0
* projection
** Ten ASEAN countries
*** China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Mongolia (excluding Japan)
Source: ADB 2009a
	 Challenges	Facing	ASEAN	and	East	Asia	in	a	Turbulent	Time	 5
Worse than expected
Overall, the collapse of major finan-
cial institutions in the USA and then 
in Europe have had a very major 
impact on the Asian economies, 
far greater than many originally 
expected. Sachs (2009: 4) points out 
that ‘Asia is experiencing a signifi-
cant downturn right now, and one 
that is probably worse than in the 
official forecasts’. That is, while the 
banks in Southeast and East Asia 
largely avoided the credit crisis, the 
real economies of these countries 
have faced two indirect, but major, 
problems brought about by the 
current GFC. Firstly, the decline of 
foreign capital and investments. 
Second, which is much more severe, 
the fall of exports. In other words, 
the challenge that ASEAN and other 
Asian countries are facing is their 
heavy reliance on advanced coun-
tries, in terms of investment and 
trade. The critical question is how 
ASEAN and other Asian countries 
will addess these challenges.
The Responses
The experience of current crisis has 
brought home to the economies of 
Southeast and East Asia that in order 
to achieve healthy and long-term 
growth they must cut their depend-
ence on the West. In order to do 
this a series of key measures have 
been implemented. These include 
creating a regional monetary fund, 
boosting domestic demand and 
investment, increasing intraregional 
trade, and increasing social protec-
tion. All of these have been in place 
or under discussion in the region’s 
major economies since the late-1990s, 
largely as a response to the experi-
ence of the 1997-8 financial crisis (see 
also Dixon 2009). However, not only 
has the crisis given new urgency to 
these measures, but with around 
US$4 trillion in foreign exchange 
reserves, large current account sur-
pluses and low inflation, Asia is well 
placed to engage in very high level of 
public expenditure (Sachs 2009: 4, 13).
Lesson one: Don’t go to the IMF
The 1997/98 financial crisis taught 
Asian countries that they could not 
depend on the IMF or the USA in 
the event of another crisis. That is 
why, following the crisis, a proposal 
to create an Asian Monetary Fund 
(AMF) was put forward. However, 
due to strong opposition from the 
USA and the IMF, it did not materi-
Table 3: Annual percentage growth rates of GDP in Southeast and 
East Asian countries
2007 2008 2009*
ASEAN** 6.2 4.3 0.7
Indonesia 6.3 6.1 3.8
Malaysia 6.3 4.6 -0.2
Singapore 7.8 1.1 -5.0
Thailand 4.9 2.6 -2.0
Vietnam 8.5 6.2 4.5
East Asia*** 10.4 6.6 3.6
China 11.3 9.0 7.0
South Korea 5.0 2.5 -3.0
* projection
** Ten ASEAN countries
*** China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Mongolia (excluding Japan)
Source: ADB 2009a
6	 Policy	Report
alise. However, in 2000, at a regional 
summit held in Chiang Mai, ASEAN 
countries and China, Japan and 
South Korea (ASEAN + 3), initiated a 
system of bilateral short-term financ-
ing facilities (see also Dixon 2009). 
Nevertheless, until the outbreak of 
the current crisis, this Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) remained simply an 
arrangement to swap relatively small 
amounts of currency. The outburst 
of the GFC finally forced the region 
to take a much more robust step by 
creating a US$120 billion fund, which 
is aimed at supporting members 
hit with the type of capital flight 
which characterised the 1997-8 crisis 
and providing an alternative to the 
IMF. However, it remains to be seen 
how this $120bn regional fund will 
operate and whether it will eventu-
ally lead to the creation of the AMF. 
Another key issue, which has not 
yet been resolved, is what currency 
will the regional fund be based 
on, China’s yuan or Japan’s yen.
Lesson 2: Promote domes-
tic demand and reduce 
export dependence
As has already been discussed the 
current crisis taught Asian countries 
that they must cut their dependence 
on exports. In order to do so they 
must boost domestic consumption. 
This has been given further urgency 
by evidence of declining domestic 
consumption in the wake of the 
contraction of exports (Economist on 
29 January 2009). While all the major 
countries have sought to stimulate 
consumption through government 
expenditure, and fiscal measures, 
these are only short-term solutions. A 
longer-term impact could be achieved 
through spending their massive 
reserves on infrastructure, educa-
tion, health or energy programmes. 
Sachs (2009: 13) points out that ‘Asia 
needs all of that desperately’, because 
Asia ‘is still the region of the world 
with the fastest urbanization, with 
the most dramatic need for pollution 
control, for cleaning up the energy 
sector, for cleaning up the rivers, for 
sustainable urban development’. By 
spending on infrastructures they also 
create jobs for people, which in return 
enables them to spend. However, 
the fundamental problem remains 
one of permanently increasing the 
propensity to spend and reduc-
ing the need to save. Engineering 
such a structural reform is not easy 
given the lack of social protection. 
Improving social protec-
tion and stability 
Asian countries cannot achieve 
growth based on domestic demand 
unless the region’s governments 
make their citizens feel less inse-
cure about their healthcare, their 
‘Asian countries cannot  
achieve growth based on 
domestic demand unless  
the region’s governments  
make their citizens feel  
less insecure’
	 Challenges	Facing	ASEAN	and	East	Asia	in	a	Turbulent	Time	 7
children’s education or their future 
and retirement. In other words, 
improving social protection is vital 
for Asian countries if they want to 
recover from the crisis and ensure 
long-term growth. Health and wel-
fare expenditure is one of the most 
effective and fastest ways of injecting 
buying power into communities. As 
Dr. Noleen Heyzer, mentioned in her 
opening speech at the ASEAN-AAF 
meeting, if Asia wants to develop 
a robust regional economy with a 
low level of poverty, social protec-
tion must be the corner stone of the 
recovery plan, providing minimum 
wage, employment insurance and 
health insurance, and increased 
individual security. In addition, it 
is believed that reducing disparities 
and poverty, and maintaining social 
protection and individual security, 
will lead to national socio-political 
stability, which is vital not only for 
the region’s economic recovery, 
but also for healthy and long-term 
development. In his closing speech 
of the ASEAN-AAF meeting, Malay-
sia’s Deputy Prime Minister Tan Sri 
Muhyiddin Yassin underlined that: 
‘National socio-political stability is 
necessary for economic recovery to 
take place. We cannot benefit even if 
the world’s economic engines some-
how manage to re-start when our 
societies are in tatters’. He further 
stressed that to avoid this policies 
have to go beyond social security to 
ensure that legislatures, judiciaries 
and civil services are ‘capable and 
robust, as well as broadly inclu-
sive and democratically-based’. 
Enhancing intra-regional trade 
ASEAN and other Asian countries 
can reduce dependence on exports 
by accelerating the growth of intra-
regional trade. One way to achieve 
this is for the Asian countries, espe-
cially ASEAN members and China, 
to see each other as end markets 
rather than as primarily links in the 
global supply chain. Again, in order 
to do this, the region’s governments 
must introduce major reforms to 
encourage their citizens to spend. 
Another way to promote the 
interregional trade is to establish free 
trade agreements. However, this is 
proving very difficult. Even though 
ASEAN agreed to establish a FTA in 
1992, progress has been very slow. 
Major barriers to regional integration 
included the lack of complementarity 
and, according to the panellists at 
the ASEAN-AAF meeting, the great 
divergence in political and economic 
conditions. In addition, the plans for 
closer regional economic have been 
further delayed by the undermining 
of ASEAN’s credibility and relevance 
by the on-going Myanmar situation 
and destabilising domestic political 
events, most recently in Thailand.
Conclusion: from challenges 
to opportunities 
In conclusion, there is no doubt 
that the global financial crisis and 
slowdown in the USA and Europe 
have brought many challenges 
to Southeast and East Asia. Even 
though the financial institutions in 
Southeast and East Asia have been 
relatively unharmed by the global 
crisis, the region’s economies were 
hit hard by the financial crisis and 
recession in the advanced countries. 
However, while ASEAN and East 
Asia face serious problems, the crisis 
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also provides opportunities to solve 
them, a point stressed by Dr Heyzer 
in the opening speech of the of the 
ASEAN-AAF meeting. Indeed, it was 
the global financial and economic 
turmoil that finally pushed the ten 
ASEAN members and three East 
Asian nations to establish the US$ 
120 billion emergency fund. This 
illustrates the manner in which these 
countries are not only attempting to 
overcome the current crisis and avoid 
similar ones in the future, but also 
consider the crisis as an opportunity 
to decrease their reliance on foreign 
capital and such agencies as the IMF. 
The crisis also gives them a good 
chance to reduce their reliance on 
exports, increase interregional trade, 
improve infrastructure, healthcare, 
social protection, and educational 
provision. There are clearly great 
opportunities. Thus, it remains to be 
seen whether the countries of South-
east and East Asia come out of the 
crisis stronger and more self-reliant.
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